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Book Review 
volutionary Governance Theory: Theory and Applications is not an easy 
read for economists. Theory, when narrowly defined, is a set of statements 
logically connecting the assumptions to the hypotheses that can be 
empirically examined. Evolutionary governance theory, or EGT as Raoul Beunen, 
Kristof van Assche and Martijn Duineveld (the editors of the book as well as 
authors of some chapters) abbreviate, is neither illogical nor anti-empiricist; it 
nevertheless follows a tradition more philosophically continental than most 
economists are accustomed to. Readers who are more comfortable with a different 
tradition but open-minded enough will no doubt benefit from the insights from this 
350-page book and the collection of articles/chapters by twenty-three scholars from 
different fields of studies. What follows in the rest of this review is my reflection 
on EGT as an economist educated in the American system. It is not possible to 
closely examine and it will also be unfair to comment on all twenty-two chapters 
with many topics and research outside my expertise.2Please consider this a warning 
in advance. 
A closer look at the resume of the editors would reveal that EGT emerges from 
their research in planning and in the philosophy of social sciences, although 
authors of many other chapters extend the EGT approach to their own specialties 
including economics, law and political science. Many of them make frequent 
references to the first two chapters penned by the editors, which can be viewed as 
their manifesto of the new theory. 
“Governing has never been a matter of government alone and the often 
mentioned shift from government to governance does not imply that governments 
are nowadays no longer playing an important role.” (p.3) This statement on the first 
paragraph in the first chapter makes a sharp contrast to the mainstream economic 
approach. Binary coding runs deep in our discipline. Any economy can be 
deconstructed into the government versus the market with zillions of individuals 
maximizing their utilities given their preferences assigned by the impartial 
observers, i.e. the economists. EGT, on the contrary, is constructive (or 
constructivist). They further explain, that “[g]overnance is never a matter of a few 
people taking decisions… There are always other actors who need to comply with 
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rules, who need to understand orders, others who need to cooperate, to advise, to 
make money.” (p.4) Regardless of what the political institution is, everyone plays a 
role, big or small, in governance. Because of such complex dynamics, EPT offers 
“[a] theoretical framework [that] shows how understanding governance as entirely 
and continuously restructuring, allows for new understandings of broader changes 
in society, and new understandings of the spaces for intervention.” (p.4) Contexts 
matter. This is a reason why the editors found inspiration in the work by Avner 
Greif, Douglass North and Elinor Ostrom. Mainstream economic theories are time 
and space independent; if we can find “one unifying principle”—not an attempt by 
EGT (p.23)—that makes the West so economically successful since the Industrial 
Revolution, failure of other countries to mimic such successes is simply a failure to 
follow the principle, not the logic for the construction of the principle itself. New 
institutionalists and economic historians seem to pay more attention to contexts—
communities’ path-, inter- and goal-dependence (Section 2.6). New Institutional 
Economics (NIE), rather vaguely defined by the editors, is one of the inspirations 
of EGT, and this is where my familiarity ends. The other two have a more 
continental root: Michel Foucault and Niklas Luhmann. 
Discourses and communications are both key elements in understanding the 
work by Foucault and Luhmann. Foucault emphasizes the relations between power 
and knowledge in discourses. “Power generates discursive processes, knowledge 
creates power, and knowledge is a product of power relations… [and] [t]hose 
power relations partly spring from access to, use of, and privileging of certain types 
of knowledge about self and environment.” (p.23) The self-environment distinction 
is echoed in Luhmann’s conception of social systems (mostly, communications) 
and how they respond to their environment. The history of macroeconomics may 
illustrate Foucualt’s power-knowledge relations and Luhmann’s social system 
theory. Measures for the aggregate economy such as the real GDP and the 
consumer price index were developed by the political and the intellectual elites for 
the purpose of governance. They have generated discourses among scholars, and 
facilitated the development of the Keynesian and the neo-classical school of 
thoughts. Often, macroeconomic theories are challenged and advanced in response 
to the drastic changes in the global economic environment such as the Great 
Depression in the 1930s, the collapse of the Bretton Wood system and the 
stagflation in the 1970s and the Great Recession in the late 2000s. The scholarly 
communication not only generates the New Neo-Classical Synthesis in the 1990s, a 
consensus in methodology between the New Keynesian and the Neo-Classical 
schools of thoughts, but also generates power in the highest political order in 
economic policy. Alan Greenspan, a former banker, was succeeded by two 
academic economists Ben Bernanke and Janet Yellen. Among the regional Federal 
Reserve presidents, four have tremendous scholarly contributions in the field of 
monetary theory, time series econometrics and dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium models.3 Power generates knowledge and in turn knowledge generates 
power. To both Foucault and Luhmann, economists are not passive observers. 
Economists observe, communicate, and make impacts. Thus, EGT can also be 
described as a meta-analysis, as researchers should also be the subjects of study at 
a higher analytical order because of this recursive process. A rather extreme notion 
to economic scientists is performativity: economists do not just study the market, 
3 James Bullard, Charles Evans, Narayana Kocherlakota and Charles Plosser. Bullard, 
Kocherlakota and Plosser are listed in the top 10 of a flawed list of most influential 
economists by The Economist magazine. http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21637412-economists-academic-rankings-and-media-influence-vary-wildly-
shifting-clout. Accessed on May 1, 2015. 
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economists, by making statements about the market, creates the market. The above 
is my modest application of Foucault and Luhmann to economics; readers may 
want to verify my interpretations of their theories by reading “Power/Knowledge as 
a Driver for Governance Evolution,” Chapter 9 by Beunen, van Assche and 
Duineveld and “Evolution of Governance or Genealogy of Power?” Chapter 14 by 
Dix. Hillier discusses “Performances and Performativities of Resilience” in the 
context of spatial planning in Chapter 12. Gunder’s “The Role of Fantasy in Public 
Policy Formation” (Chapter 10) may interest academic readers in the field of 
ideology and social policy. 
Given these intellectual lineages of EGT, it is best described as a 
methodological approach. Gert Verschraegen’s “The Evolution of Welfare State 
Governance” (Chapter 4) serves as a typical example. This chapter focuses on the 
economic and the political systems. Economics define the market and seek for the 
conditions that make an equilibrium Pareto efficient. Thus, “[f]rom the point of 
view of the economic subsystem, [] welfare benefits can be seen as a major burden 
on economic productivity or labor market transparency.” (p.58) Luhmann asserts 
that systems or subsystems are autopoietic. Economists have their internal 
communications (e.g. marginal product of labor equal to the real wage without 
government intervention) and without which the displicine cannot be economics. 
But “[f]rom point of view of the political system the welfare state is rather seen as 
an instrument of ‘social cohesion’ or ‘interest intermediation’ between generations 
(f.i. pensions, child benefits) or between employers and labor movement (f.i. 
unemployment benefits).” (p.58) In Luhmannian terms, as Verscharaegen point 
outs, these differences in terminologies are necessary to articulate the “identity” or 
“functional logic in a systematic and scholarly manner.” At this level, from the 
standpoints of two groups of scientific observers, there is a rivalry in the two 
logical systems. However, at a higher level of observation, Verscharaegen argues 
that the welfare state, a politically sound idea may in fact be economically sound as 
well. “[B]y establishing social rights and setting clear boundaries to the economy, 
the welfare state defines the area of competence of the market and delineates it 
from all other, non-economic social spheres. It ensures that the market logic does 
not colonize societal domains such as education, the media, politics, health care, 
the arts, etc., and thus sustains the societal preconditions on which the market itself 
is dependent.” (p.63) The two systems are in fact interdependent, but the internal 
logic of economics create a blind spot in our observations. Economies and markets 
are not created in a vacuum. They are founded on certain “societal preconditions” 
if we care enough to study the context. Yet, increasing productivity can dominate 
and alter these foundations and consequently limit the stability and the healthy 
growth of the economy. At one level, we may see the welfare state a contradiction 
to economic efficiency. At a different level, the evidence may be “[a]gainst the 
neo-liberal assumption of a big ‘trade-off’ between economic efficiency and social 
justice, [and] welfare states are thus built on the assumption that social policy is 
conducive to promoting economic adjustment, and that there is no contradiction 
between economic competitiveness and social cohesion.” (p.60) This philosophical 
insight is profound. It also provides a rationale of the co-existence of both the 
market and the welfare state. Whether it is adequate in convincing market-obsessed 
economists and social justice crusading political scientists is a different story. 
Indeed, many of the analyses found in the book require us to rethink of the 
commonly used concepts in a new light. For example, instead of arguing that law 
serves certain honorable moral purpose, as a social system, it serves a rather neutral 
function of “stabilizing expectations.” (Chapter 4, “Planning and Law in Evolving 
Governance”). By stepping away from the internal logic fixated to a more narrowly 
defined scholarly tradition, social scientists from different viewpoints may be able 
TER, 2(2), M. C. Lo, p.133-136. 
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to find synthesis that can lead us to solutions of many social problems. This agenda 
is very ambitious and the authors might not have succeeded in laying out a clear 
road map of their approach with only one publication. Economic methodologists 
would find the narratives in many chapters refreshing. Political economists would 
find unique insights in the aforementioned Chapter 4 and 10. Development 
economists would be fascinated by the rich case studies (Part IV)of countries in 
Asia and Europe conducted by planning researchers. Martin Petrick’s “Between 
Individual Autonomy and Centralized Control: Outlining an Evolutionary Model of 
Neo-endogenous Rural Development” (Chapter 17) offers the most mathematically 
technical chapter of game theoretical modeling that microeconomists would 
appreciate. My only regret about the book is that the connection between EGT and 
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